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1 Introduction
Recent years have seen remarkable advances in the life sciences, including
increasing technical capacities to reproduce, manipulate and even replace
living nature with the products of human artefact. These developments
raise important questions about our understanding of that which we
call ‘life’. If, as science suggests, there is in principle no difficulty in en-
gineering the living world in the same way as we build and construct the
non-living world, then what is the ground for our distinction between the
seemingly so self-sufficient and self-determined living beings and the ap-
parently inert and inactive non-living parts of nature? If the difference
between the living and the non-living cannot be based on the distinction
between that which escapes and that which is within our control and ma-
nipulation, what makes our experience of a blossoming tree so fundamen-
tally different from the experience of a piece of woodwork?
In light of the advances of the biological sciences and an increasing
interest in the philosophy of biology, Kant’s treatment of the living de-
serves particular attention.1 Kant’s account occupies a unique position.
1 In the recent literature, Kant’s teleological account of the organism has received
revived interest. To mention only a few examples, see Quarfood, Marcel : Tran-
scendental Idealism and the Organism: Essays on Kant. Stockholm 2004; Guyer,
Paul: Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom: Selected Essays. Oxford 2005; Gins-
borg, Hannah: “Kant’s Biological Teleology and its Philosophical Significance”.
In: A Companion to Kant. Ed. G. Bird. Oxford 2006, 455 ff.; Zuckert, Rachel:
Kant on Beauty and Biology: An Interpretation of the Critique of Judgment. Cam-
bridge 2007; Breitenbach, Angela: Die Analogie von Vernunft und Natur: Eine
Umweltphilosophie nach Kant. Berlin 2009; as well as the collections by Steiger-
wald, Joan (ed.): Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical
Sciences 37, Special Issue on Kantian Philosophy and the Life Sciences, 2006; Hune-
man, Philippe (ed.): Understanding Purpose: Kant and the Philosophy of Biology.
Rochester 2007; Illetterati, Luca and Michelini, Francesca (eds.): Purposiveness :
Teleology Between Nature and Mind. Frankfurt 2008; Heidemann, Dietmar
(ed.): Kant Yearbook: Teleology 1, 2009.
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On the one hand, Kant rejects a purely mechanistic understanding of liv-
ing nature and develops a teleological account of the organism as charac-
terised by purposiveness and goal-directedness. Thus, our understanding
of living beings, on Kant’s account, is not determined purely by what we
can explain causally and reproduce mechanically. Instead, it includes an
important teleological element. And yet, Kant denies, on the other
hand, that we could make any determinate knowledge claims about pur-
poses in nature. All we can affirm, on his account, is that we can, and
indeed must, regard living nature by means of an analogy as if it were
purposive. The apparently striving and directed character of the living,
Kant claims, is something we read into nature.
Kant’s analogical conception of living nature, I argue in this paper,
opens up a possibility of making sense of our experience of life that stands
up to the challenge posed by recent advances in the life sciences. Kant’s
account, I suggest, makes sense of our experience of the living world as
essentially characterised by a self-determined and goal-directed activity,
while, at the same time, allowing for causal explanation and technical ma-
nipulation of that which is identified as alive.
In order to develop this claim I begin, in Section 2, by giving a brief
sketch of Kant’s analogical account of the organism. I argue that, accord-
ing to Kant, we make sense of the distinguishing character of living na-
ture by analogy with our own capacity for purposive activity. In Section 3,
I examine in more detail how precisely Kant’s analogy grounds our under-
standing of living nature. I argue that the analogy does not play a purely
heuristic role in our search for causal explanations but that it is a neces-
sary condition for making sense of something as a living being at all. This
result, as I show in Section 4, has important consequences for the possi-
bility of experiencing life in nature. It entails, I argue, that our very ex-
perience of something as alive has a reflective and analogical character.
This characterisation of our experience of the living world raises an im-
portant question about the compatibility of Kant’s account with the aims
of modern science. In Section 5, I argue that Kant’s analogical approach is
not only compatible with the possibility of gaining scientific knowledge
about organisms but also sheds light on the special nature of our experi-
ence of life. I conclude that Kant’s account makes sense of the particular
character of our experience of living nature even in the context of modern
biology.
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2 Kant’s Analogy Between Living Nature and
Human Purposiveness
In the Critique of Teleological Judgment, Kant argues that our experience
of organisms essentially differs from that of non-living nature. We expe-
rience living beings as distinguished by a two-fold teleological organisa-
tion: by a particular arrangement of the parts within the whole and by
a reciprocal interdependency between the individual parts. If we consider,
for example, “the structure of a bird, the hollowness of its bones, the
placement of the wings for movement and of its tail for steering, etc.”
we think of the parts of the bird as determined by their function within
the organism as a whole (KU, AA 05: 360; 232).2 We can only under-
stand what a wing is, for instance, by reference to its contribution towards
the bird’s capacity to fly. The existence and form of the parts thus appear
as if they were purposive for the existence and survival of the organism as
a whole. Moreover, the parts of an organism also appear as if they were
dependent on each other. The organs of a bird, the wings, tail, heart and
digestive system, for example, can live, grow and function only in mutual
interaction. None of the parts can survive on their own. Considered as a
whole, the organism thus seems to maintain and bring about itself. In its
generation, development and regeneration of damaged parts, the organ-
ism appears to strive towards its own existence. Living beings thus display
not only a purposive organisation of their parts within the whole but also
a capacity for end-directed self-organisation.
This two-fold teleological character of living beings, Kant argues,
cannot be explained mechanically. To explain an object mechanically is
to explain it in terms of the way in which its parts act on one another
by means of their forces of attraction and repulsion. By reference to me-
chanical laws we thus explain changes in a material body in terms of the
causal relations between its material parts. But to explain a complex ma-
terial thing merely by reference to the interaction of its parts is precisely
not to explain in what sense the parts are there for, have a function in, or
are directed towards, the whole. What, then, is it to regard organisms as
purposively organised and self-organising beings? According to Kant, we
cannot experience, or know of, any purposes in nature. Purposes are es-
sentially tied to intentionality, he argues, to an intellect that sets some-
2 Translations of the Critique of Judgment are guided by Kant, Immanuel: Critique
of the Power of Judgment. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (transl.). Cambridge
2000, but may be altered. All other translations are my own.
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thing as a purpose.3 However closely we investigate nature, we will never
find any such intentional purposiveness in nature. All we will ever be able
to discover through the study of nature are cause and effect relations. The
idea of a purpose must therefore be something that is read into nature by
us: We consider organisms as if they were purposive.
On Kant’s account, our teleological conception of organisms is thus
essentially analogical. It is based on the analogy with something else
which we take to be purposive. Many commentators have associated
this analogy with its theological version well rehearsed long before
Kant. This is the analogy between nature and design, and between the
creator of nature and an intelligent designer.4 Kant is said to use this anal-
ogy in a novel way, not in order to prove the existence of an intelligent
author of the universe, but as an analogical elucidation of our under-
standing of living beings. According to this reading, we only regard living
beings as if they were the products of design. In the Critique of Judgment
Kant makes it explicit, however, that the analogy with artefacts is ulti-
mately insufficient for an understanding of organic nature. Thus, he
claims, “[o]ne says far too little about nature and its capacity in organised
products if one calls this an analogue of art” (KU, AA 05: 374; 246).
While artefacts are the products of an external intelligence distinct
from these products, organisms seem to produce themselves ; they appear
to be the products of their own striving. The analogy between nature and
the product of intelligent design could thus account for the first charac-
terisation of organisms as displaying purposive organisation. It would not,
however, make sense of the second characterisation of living beings as self-
3 A discussion of this claim is beyond the scope of this paper. The assumption has
been criticised by those who argue that natural purposiveness should not be in-
terpreted on the model of the teleology of action but on that of interdependent
causal processes. Cf. , e. g., Toepfer, Georg: “Teleology in Natural Organised Sys-
tems and Artefacts : Interdependence of Processes versus External Design”. In: Ill-
etterati : Purposiveness, 162–181.
4 This reading is proposed by some of the most often cited commentators of
Kant’s teleology, including McFarland, John: Kant’s Concept of Teleology. Edin-
burgh 1970, 111; McLaughlin, Peter: Kant’s Critique of Teleology in Biological Ex-
planation. Lewiston, NY 1990, 39; and Guyer, Paul: “Organisms and the Unity
of Science”. In: Watkins, Eric (ed.): Kant and the Sciences. Oxford 2001, 259 ff. A
more critical reading of the artefact analogy can be found in Ginsborg, Hannah:
“Two Kinds of Mechanical Inexplicability in Kant and Aristotle”. In: Journal of
the History of Philosophy 42, 2004, 33 ff.; and Zuckert: Kant on Beauty and Bi-
ology. I have dealt with the question of the precise content of Kant’s analogy in
detail in Breitenbach: Die Analogie von Vernunft und Natur, chapters 3 and 4.
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organising, that is, as maintaining themselves and striving for their own
existence and survival.
The organised and self-organising character of living beings is not,
therefore, understood purely in accordance with the artefact model. Rath-
er, in a second step, we must consider organisms by analogy with our own
rational capacity of freely setting ourselves ends and of acting for those
ends. Thus, in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant de-
fines life as “the capacity of a substance to determine itself to act from an
inner principle” (MAN, AA 04: 544). This “inner principle” is, as Kant
spells out in the Critique of Judgment, “our causality in accordance with
ends” (KU, AA 05: 375; 247). Just as in our actions we strive to realise
purposes that we have set ourselves and aim, thereby, to maintain our ca-
pacity for free activity, so we also view organisms as if they were directed
at their own ends and, ultimately, at their own survival as an organised
whole. In experiencing something as alive, we thus read the idea of our
own rational capacity for purposive activity and the striving for unity
into nature. We reflect about living beings as if they were the products
of their own striving. In this way, the analogy with human reason can ac-
count for both the unified organisation and the purposive self-organisa-
tion of living beings.
3 The Epistemic Function of Kant’s Analogy
We thus regard living beings as if they were purposively organised and
self-organising by analogy with our own capacity for purposive activity.
This raises an important question about the epistemic function of
Kant’s analogy. For if the analogy is necessary for making sense of the dis-
tinguishing character of living nature at all, then its role must go beyond
what is commonly described as its heuristic dimension. According to this
purely heuristic function of Kant’s analogy, our analogical consideration
of organisms as purposively organised and goal-directed beings is a useful
tool for the study of nature. Thus, Kant writes,
it is a […] necessary maxim of reason not to bypass the principle of ends in
the products of nature, because even though this principle does not make the
way in which these products have originated more comprehensible, it is still
a heuristic principle for researching the particular laws of nature. (KU, AA
05: 411; 280)
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The “principle of ends”, that is, the maxim to regard nature as if it were
purposive, does not explain the origin of an organism or, as Kant adds,
“the ground of its possibility” (ibid.). But it may nevertheless help us
in explaining nature by guiding our search for natural laws. When we re-
flect on organisms by analogy with our own capacity for end-directed ac-
tivity, we may ask for the particular purpose of a trait, or an organ, or a
particular activity of a living being. By thus considering certain parts of
nature as purposive for other parts, and by thinking about the organism
as a whole as directed towards its own survival, we may uncover depen-
dencies that indicate the existence of natural laws and that provide further
causal knowledge of the world around us. The analogy may thus present a
useful means, as Kant puts it in his Lectures on Logic, “for the sake of the
extending of our cognition by experience” (Log, AA 09: 133).
If, however, Kant’s analogy performed only this heuristic function
then we could dispense with it as soon as an adequate causal explanation
had been achieved. Once we had found out, for instance, how the leaves
of a tree causally affect the survival of the tree as a whole, we would no
longer have to regard the tree’s leaves as if they were in any way purposive
for the tree’s survival. The analogy could ultimately be reduced to the
causal and mechanical explanations that it helps us to discover. This con-
clusion, however, would be at odds with Kant’s claims about the necessity
and indispensability of the analogical reflection. Thus, Kant argues that
causal-mechanical explanations of nature
could of course subsist alongside the teleological principle, but could by no
means make the latter dispensable; i. e. , one could investigate all the thus far
known and yet to be discovered laws of mechanical generation in a thing that
we must judge as an end of nature, and even hope to make good progress in
this, without the appeal to a quite distinct generating ground for the possi-
bility of such a product, namely that of causality through ends, ever being
cancelled out. (KU, AA 05: 409; 278)
Mechanical explanations, Kant claims here, will never be able to account
for the particular character of living beings. The teleological perspective
will always remain necessary.
What further role remains, then, for Kant’s analogy over and above its
heuristic function? Kant crucially claims that we can make sense of the
very possibility of an organism only by means of the analogy. Our analog-
ical reflection about living nature, Kant suggests, has not only heuristic
import but also a necessary role in our very thinking about the “form”
and “internal possibility” of living nature (KU, AA 05: 408; 277; and
05: 373; 245). For beings with a type of understanding such as our
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own the very “possibility of the form” of an organism can only be grasped
by means of the analogy with human purposiveness (KU, AA 05: 408;
277).
In order to make sense of this claim, we need to take into account a
second function that analogies perform on Kant’s account. Thus, analo-
gies provide not only a heuristic tool but also an indirect, symbolic rep-
resentation of concepts that cannot be represented directly. This role of
analogical reasoning is important for Kant insofar as we can make
sense of a concept, on his account, only if we can give an intuitive rep-
resentation of it.5 In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had shown that the
transcendental schemata provide a direct intuitive representation of the a
priori concepts of the understanding. By containing the rules for applying
the a priori concepts to the empirical world, the schemata establish the
empirical validity, and hence reality, of the a priori concepts.6 Those a pri-
ori concepts “which only reason can think”, by contrast, cannot be rep-
resented directly in this way (KU, AA 05: 351; 225). The ideas of reason,
such as the idea of a God or the world as a whole, can be represented only
indirectly by means of a symbol, where a symbol, in turn, represents “by
means of an analogy” (KU, AA 05: 352; 226). The indirect, symbolic
representation is made possible, Kant explains, by judgment performing
a double task, first applying the concept to the object of a sensible intuition,
and then, second, applying the mere rule of reflection on that intuition to an
entirely different object, of which the first is only the symbol. (ibid.)
By applying a concept to an object experienced in intuition, we can thus
transfer the way we think about the first object to the unknown second
object.
For Kant’s account of living nature, this means that analogical reflec-
tion is necessary in order to provide intuitive representation of the living
world. As we have seen, the distinguishing character of living beings, their
purposiveness and goal-directedness, cannot be represented directly. We
cannot, in other words, ascribe purposiveness to nature itself. We can
only represent the purposive character of living nature indirectly by
means of the analogy with our own capacity of setting ends and acting
for purposes. Kant’s analogy thus performs not only a heuristic role in
our search for mechanical explanations, but it also provides a symbolic
representation of life in nature.
5 Cf. FM, AA 20: 279 f.
6 Cf. KrV, A 141/B 179 f.
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4 The Particular Character of Our Experience of Life
If, then, our experience of living nature is necessarily based on analogical
reflection, this has crucial implications for the particular character of that
experience. The fact that the analogy between organisms and human pur-
posiveness is not purely heuristic but provides a necessary condition for
making sense of something as a living being at all means that we cannot
have the experience of an organism independently of our implicitly sub-
jecting certain sensations of the living world to analogical reflection.
Without Kant’s analogy, we could not experience any purposiveness in
nature. All we could find in nature would be cause and effect relations.
It is thus the analogical reflection itself that grounds not only our under-
standing of what it is for something to be alive but also the very experi-
ence of something as a living being.
This thought requires elaboration. For one may worry that something
could not be the object of analogical reflection unless we already had a
fairly stable, empirically grounded conception of it. The difficulty, in
other words, lies in showing that our experience of living nature is, on
the one hand, based on the analogical thought process that enables us
to make sense of the particular purposive character of life while, on the
other hand, being grounded in an objective awareness of the world
around us.
At least part of the solution to this problem is provided, I believe, by
the distinction between two conceptions of “experience”. We may have
experience of the living world in one sense, without having experience
of what distinguishes the living from the non-living world in another
sense. Thus, independently of the analogy with our own purposiveness
we can have experience of objects, based on application of the categories.
By itself, however, this categorical experience does not give us any under-
standing of what it is for the thing thus experienced to be part of the liv-
ing world. For a richer experience of something as a living being, the
analogy with our own purposive activity must come into play. And
here, the crucial insight of Kant’s account is that our analogical experi-
ence of living nature is based on a creative thought process. Our analog-
ical reflection does not simply draw out existing similarities between or-
ganisms and our own capacity for purposive activity but it creates these
similarities. This creative process can be described as an interactive reflec-
Angela Breitenbach26
Brought to you by | Cambridge University Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 5/5/16 3:48 PM
tion.7 By combining and comparing different associations that we con-
nect with the two sides of the analogy, we come to see certain aspects
of the analoga that we would not have seen otherwise. Through projec-
ting certain properties of the first analogon onto the second, we reflect
about the two sides of the analogy in a way that would not have been
possible without the analogy. It is this “double task” of our faculty of
judgment – of reflecting about one object and of transferring those reflec-
tions onto another object – that thus enables us to experience parts of na-
ture as purposive (ibid.).
As a result, our experience of living beings has a crucially different
character from experience as it is ordinarily understood on Kant’s ac-
count. My experience of something as alive is essentially unlike the expe-
riences I have when I see a car passing by outside my window, when I hear
the news on the radio, or when I smell my neighbour’s cooking. Experi-
encing life in nature does not provide me with determinate knowledge of
the world around me. Rather, it presents a non-determining, reflecting
type of experience that leads me to see the world in a different light. It
is non-determining because it is based on a judgment that fails to sub-
sume our experiences of nature under the concept of a purpose. And it
is reflecting because it is nevertheless grounded in considerations about
our experiences of nature by means of an analogy.8
Even if the experience of organisms in nature, of cats and dogs, flow-
ers and trees, is essentially analogical, however, one may wonder whether
we do not have direct intuitive representation of our own vitality. One
might object that, since we are directly familiar with our own purposive
activity, we could experience our own life without dependency on analog-
ical reflection. I believe, however, that there are serious difficulties with
this suggestion. The experience of myself as setting myself purposes
and as striving to achieve my own ends is itself non-determining and re-
flecting. I may always doubt whether I really acted for my own, freely set
purposes, or whether I was only moved along by causal laws, by an invis-
ible demon, or by another exterior principle. Even in my own case, it
therefore seems, I must read the idea of the capacity for purposiveness
7 This interactive account of Kant’s analogy is related to the interaction theoretical
conception of metaphors. Cf., e. g., Black, Max: Models and Metaphors : Studies
in Language and Philosophy. Ithaca 1962, 25 ff.
8 This characterisation of the experience of life has striking similarities with aes-
thetic experience. I discuss this similarity in Breitenbach, Angela: “Biological
Purposiveness and Analogical Reflection”. In: Kant’s Theory of Biology. Ed. I.
Goy and E. Watkins. Berlin-Boston, forthcoming.
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and for the free setting of ends into the experience of my own activity.
This suggestion raises further difficult questions about the analogical
basis of our conception of ourselves as purposive living agents. These
questions go beyond the scope of this paper. I believe that they indicate,
however, that the analogy between living nature and the purposive capaci-
ty of human beings is ultimately significant for our understanding of
both sides of the analogy.9
5 Biological Science and the Experience of Life
I have thus argued that on Kant’s account it is a necessary condition of
our very experience of something as a living being that we view it by
means of the analogy with our own capacity for purposive activity. It fol-
lows, I have shown, that our experience of something as alive has a special
character. It is an essentially non-determining and reflecting type of expe-
rience. One might object that this claim has rather counterintuitive epis-
temic consequences. Since, on Kant’s view, analogical reflection is embed-
ded ineliminably in our experience of the living world, it seems that noth-
ing we say about rabbits and blades of grass, for instance, could ever
count as cognition. And yet, if no knowledge about the living world
were possible, then biology would lose the status of a science. No scien-
tific knowledge of living nature could ever be achieved.
I believe that this objection to Kant’s account is mistaken in an im-
portant way. Kant’s analogical account of living nature, I suggest, is not
only compatible with the possibility of biology as a science. It also pro-
vides a plausible account of the special nature of our experience of life
that sits comfortably with recent advances of modern biology. The
claim that our experience of life requires analogical reflection is an epis-
temological claim about what it is for us to consider something as alive
rather than as a non-living piece of matter. Kant’s analogical approach
thus aims to give an account of the way in which we have to reflect
about nature in order to make sense of it as a living being. As a result,
Kant’s analogy does not rule out that the structures and processes we
find in nature can also be explained in purely causal terms. It is possible
to abstract from our analogical reflection about nature and to explain
9 This, I believe, is why Kant employs a similar analogy in his discussion of the
organism in the third Critique, and in his treatment of reason in the first Cri-
tique. Cf. KrV, A 832 f./B 860 f.
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what we have picked out as an organism by means of the underlying cau-
sal processes that determine nature. And it is this abstraction from our
analogical reflections that makes biological knowledge possible.
Kant’s analogical account of our experience of life thus leaves room
for determinate claims that can provide us with knowledge of the living
world. And yet, crucially, purely by means of such determinate knowledge
claims, we could never fully grasp what, for us, distinguishes the special
character of the living from the non-living world. On Kant’s account, the
analogy remains necessary even for the biologist who needs to assume it,
if only implicitly, in order to be able to pick out and identify something
as alive at all.
Kant’s analogical approach thus offers an account of our experience of
the living world that sheds light on the question why we seem to experi-
ence living beings as so fundamentally different from the non-living
world. Even if there is in principle no difficulty in manipulating and me-
chanically reproducing the living world, we nevertheless experience na-
ture as essentially characterised by a self-determined and goal-directed ac-
tivity. And even if, in science, the difference between the living and the
non-living parts of nature cannot be based on the distinction between
that which escapes and that which is within our control and manipula-
tion, we nevertheless experience the living but not the non-living world
as necessarily determined by an inner principle. Even within the context
of modern biology, the special character of our experience of life must be
regarded by analogy with our own capacity for purposive activity. Far
from proving Kant’s teleological conception of nature as presenting an
outdated piece of history, I conclude that recent developments in the bio-
logical sciences have made Kant’s analogical account all the more relevant.
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